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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

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THE JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
PSYCHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHODS

HISTORY, PSYCHOLOGY AND CULTURE: A SET OF CATEGORIES FOR AN INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL SCIENCE

PART II

VII

Deterministic-Historical Category.—The facts of this group have led to a great deal of discussion, controversy and philosophical speculation. It is the writer's opinion that they also have been the most misunderstood. On the one hand we have evolutionary formulations, such as Spencer's, based on an implicit faith in rigid historical determinism, which in Spencer's presentation takes the form of quasi-organic principles of cultural development, forever and everywhere the same. While the cast-iron system of the philosopher of evolution has been often and rudely shaken in many of its specific allegations, as well as in its fundamental postulates, the faith in historic uniformities persists, and with it the tendency to formulate historic laws. Breysig's attempt is particularly interesting in this connection, for, whereas it is even weaker in its specific formulations than was perhaps inevitable, it well represents the fairly common tendency. In all such systems the discrepancies in the historical processes compared are never rated as theoretically on a par with the uniformities, nor as of equal significance. The discrepancies are either overlooked, thus involving a serious misrepresentation of the facts, or they are regarded as somehow less real or less deep than the uniformities, or they are brushed aside as "disturbing agencies." That in the last assertion there lies, in a very qualified sense, a measure of truth, will, I think, appear from what follows. On the other hand, the theoretical and methodological problems involved have been attacked critically by a number of historians and philosophers,

some of whom, at least, have reached the conclusion that a radical difference exists between the natural and the historical sciences, that, whereas the former are amenable to conceptualization in the form of "laws," the latter do not permit of any such process, the historical series of events being too complex, the events themselves too discrete, too individual for subsummation into sweeping generalizations. Some thinkers, while admitting the "uniqueness" of historic events, claim that whereas the concept of "law" is not applicable to history, a partial conceptualization of the successive series is nevertheless attainable, under the heading of "principles" of more or less wide application.

It seems to the writer that an analytical separation for heuristic purposes of the deterministic from the accidental factors in history, tends to throw a great deal of light on the proper sphere of each, as well as on their interrelations. Meanwhile we must keep in mind that the concept "determinism," as here understood, will always be relative to the concept of "a system" of preferential relations.

An examination of the deterministic series reveals the presence of a number of factors which fall into several groups, such as: logical, mechanical, psychological, socio-psychological, and still another group of factors not readily definable by a term, which are comprised in the concept of "limitation of possibilities."

The logical determinism can be exemplified by the history of mathematics. The discovery of analytical geometry by Descartes made possible a practically endless series of further discoveries and applications (which, essentially, are also discoveries), including the differential calculus. When that discovery was made by Newton and Leibnitz, mathematics came into possession of a tool so powerful and far-reaching, that even to-day no accurate estimate can be made of the limits of its usefulness. This stands for a staggering array of new mathematical discoveries. Again, Lobatchevsky's penetrating reexamination of the postulates of the Euclidian geometry led to the concept of the possibility and to the concrete realization of alternative systems. The effect on the world of mathematical thought was cataclysmic; the mighty pillars of absolutism, heretofore the secure foundations of the edifice of science, suddenly gave way. Mathematics, and with it the theoretical branches of the exact sciences, turned their backs on absolutism and embraced the Theory of Relativity.

Mechanical determinism is observable in the realm of invention, in the narrowest sense. As progress from primitive to modern conditions is in no other domain so conspicuous and indispensable as it is in technical, mechanical achievement, the application of the deter-

ministic category in this context becomes of special importance. In a most general formulation determinism here expresses itself in the fact that, pending a particular invention, or one of a class, further progress, further inventions in a given field become impossible; then, when the required invention is made, a new domain for further progress is opened, sometimes a domain of great vastness; and numerous further inventions presently follow. The last fact, however, belongs to another set of factors; the mechanical, which in another aspect is also a conceptual determinism, merely comprises the opening of new possibilities; an invention is made, this prepares the way for another, or one of a set, and, granted that invention in the field continues, that is, that one or a number of ingenious minds apply themselves to the problem, the further invention, or one of a set, which is now made possible, will actually be made. A good illustration is provided by the aeroplane. Not so long ago the ultimate solution of the problem of aerial flight in heavier-than-air machines was gradually passing into the realm of unrealizable dreams. Men like Jules Verne and Wells saw visions of future bird-men, but those technically competent were growing skeptical as to the possibility of ever finding a motor light enough yet powerful enough to drive through space such an aerial mechanism. When the feat was achieved, the Wrights having made flying in heavier-than-air machines a reality, a new vista was opened for future mechanical achievements; and one by one, slowly at first, then with amazing rapidity, they were realized. The rapidity falls outside the deterministic chain, being due to the intrusion into the aeroplane invention series of an accidental factor, the war; the fact of interest in connection with determinism being the opening of the doors for further inventions by the achievement of one. The history of the printing press, of the hydraulic hammer and press, of the reciprocating and later of the turbine engine, of the telephone, telescope, wireless, of the submarine, finally, abounds in situations of just that sort.

The domain of socio-psychological principles embraces a vast array of facts of the deterministic-historical category. Take the facts of standardization. Cultural features representing a certain aspect of culture, such as religion, art, ethics, tend to develop one or more standards or patterns and to conform to the same. In the absence of disturbing, complicating, or opposing tendencies, these patterns prevail over possible rivals to such an extent as to constitute practically fixed or crystallized forms. The success of these tendencies is roughly proportionate to the simplicity and isolation of a culture. Another socio-psychological principle of this type is

what one might call the formalization of cultural features, the losing of the emotional or intellectual content on the part of a rite or an institution, so that only the shell, the form, the behavior remains. This is the domain of what is currently known as survivals. Familiar examples are marriage by capture, which from a grim reality becomes a mere puzzling symbol, or magical rites which evolve into children's games, or prayers which are not even suggested by a set of nonsense words, or that endless host of religious beliefs, practises, experiences, which become but mere shadows of their former selves when fed only on Marett's "evaporated emotions." In a wider sense, every culture teems with survivals; for the decay of the psychic content of institutions is an ever-present and constant process. It is compensated for by another socio-psychological principle of the deterministic-successive category, namely, the never ceasing appearance of new contents, new values, new functions. This is perhaps best exemplified by the fluctuations of functions of social units. A clan originally controlling exogamy becomes a religio-ceremonial unit, possibly but not necessarily at the loss of its function as a regulator of marriage; a guild organized for technological reasons, grows into an economic, social, political factor; a social body called into being for the dispensation of charity develops into a mighty political machine, still charitable, but to whom? An institution created for the promotion of learning becomes an athletic club or a military organization, *etc., etc.* The principle of division of labor also belongs here. Take a group of individuals with certain tasks to perform, and sooner or later specialization, often accompanied by a multiplication of tasks, and division of labor will set in. This will obtain whether the group is primitive or modern, natural or artificial. Another less obvious instance is synchretism. As usually employed the term refers to the tendency of a deity in the ascendency to absorb the qualities and functions of other deities whom it gradually supersedes. But in a wider sense, this tendency is observable wherever there is development in the direction of centralization with accompanying shifting of functions, whether it be a machine which, after a prolonged process of progressive complication through the addition of separate parts for new functions, becomes simplified so that a few well-coordinated mechanical contrivances perform the same task equally well or better (of course, no socio-psychological element is involved here); or a business concern or factory, where, after consultation with a scientific management expert, the agents and functions are reappointed in such a way, that one or a few centrally located individuals,—in a functional, not necessarily spacial sense,—assume functions of coordination

and regulation referring to the mutual relations of the functional units, while the special tasks fall to the separate units; it is, finally, so with the State, when numerous powers and functions are assumed by the central administration, until only functions of purely local and individual concern are left to the constituent minor social units and the individuals comprising them.

Two further principles must be mentioned here, one of which might be designated as the principle of the natural limits of development, the other as the principle of the pendulum, or of rhythm, or of reaction. The two principles are correlated. Development in a certain direction will often continue, according to the principle of inertia[6] or the line of least resistance, until a physical limit is reached, or a psychological limit, which makes the situation absurd or self-defeating; then reaction sets in, "opposite" developments come into favor, the pendulum swings back, perhaps only to return with a similar exaggerated sweep. This rhythmic pulsation of development is a familiar aspect of the historic process and has often been commented upon. An ornamental art becomes ornate; the possibilities of at all acceptable decorative excesses having become exhausted, a reaction sets in in favor of simple lines and inobtrusive patterns. It is interesting to note that the historic Moslem, and Rococo, and even late Gothic, have their counterparts in the primitive arts of New Guinea and New Zealand. The approximate limits of ornateness having been reached, these primitive techniques might be expected to generate tendencies in compensating directions, if indeed they developed at all. Similarly, the reputations of philosophers, scientists, musicians, at first monstrously inflated, are presently permitted to pass into oblivion, sometimes only to reawaken for another equally brilliant career. The doctrine of evolution, after a seemingly successful attempt to engulf all natural scientific thinking, grows top-heavy with its many tasks, finally becoming itself submerged in an atmosphere of critical caution which savors of skepticism; Romanticism engenders Realism, and *vice versa;* a Hegel has his Marx, and in a different discipline and level, a Münsterberg his C. A. Strong; political centralization carried to excess provokes a cataclysmic revolution in favor of the autonomy of the constituent social units or of the self-assertion of individuals; the

[6] The principle of inertia, in one of its aspects, is itself a most significant illustration of psychological determinism: present acts and attitudes are, *ceteris paribus,* determined by past acts and attitudes, in so far as their very occurrence establishes a bias in favor of their repetition or retention. So far we are in the domain of individual psychology. Cultural inertia, the essential stabilizer of the cultural content but the arch-enemy of progress, comprises, of course, more than the mere psychological inertia of the individual, but that plus the cumulative inertia of institutionalism.

chaos or friction born of multiple autonomous units fosters anew leanings toward centralization, which may again be realized only to be once more defeated.

There remains one further important principle belonging to the deterministic-historical category, the principle of the limitation of possibilities in developments.

Sherlock Holmes once said with reference to the detection of crime: having excluded the impossible, accept the alternative, no matter how improbable. This shrewd remark has wide bearings on the interpretation of historic phenomena. To say that there is only one possibility of development, is to say that the event is categorically determined. Such is the nature of the cosmic determinism which underlies our naturalistic philosophy. With reference to the phenomena of interest in human history, determinism, as was shown before, is never categorical, but relative; one of the aspects of such determinism is expressed in the principle of limited possibilities. Even in the domain of the history of mathematics, the most rigorously deterministic of the successive series, there exist multiple possibilities of development. Thus, the differential calculus can be derived from the theory of limits as well as from that of infinitesimals, and the series of successive stages, inventions, in the two cases is different. In the line of mechanical invention—granted, however, that the problem is clearly defined—the number of possible solutions is usually strictly limited. The known mechanical principles constitute one drastic limitation; another, or set of others, is contributed by the preexisting properties of the machine which is to be improved by the new invention—if such be the nature of the task; in actual experience, the financial limitations are also of the greatest importance. This, however, brings in a factor, which, intrinsically, of course, has nothing to do with the limitations of mechanical series; therefore, when under war conditions the financial restrictions are practically eliminated, a tremendous precipitation of inventions is the result. In the domain of material things, the objective or technical limitations imposed upon the solutions of problems of use are often stringent. There are not many ways in which a handle of a sword, or a paddle, or a knife can be made, and remain fit for use; therefore, all of the possible ways have been actualized among different tribes and each has probably been arrived at more than once. The same is true of the basic shape of ladles and dishes, of boats and canoes, of bows and shields, and even of such things as percussion instruments and fire-making apparatus. In social organization, given human nature, the possibilities of a natural grouping, such as is to be expected in a primitive community, seem limited indeed. Every group of people, limited in size by the natural balance of

birth and death, must live somewhere. No matter how fleeting, how little organized such residence may be in a truly primitive group—experience shows, however, that strictly migratory peoples, like the gypsies, are foreign to the primitive world—certain associations, habits, memories are formed which identify the group with the locality, from which the name of the group is so often derived. Then again, the biological conditions of sex determine the nucleus of a family, which through associations, affection, the desire for protection, the necessity of preserving the offspring, *etc.*, also acquires accretions enough to constitute a fairly intimate socio-psychological unit. Finally, the local as well as the biological factors become extended through subjective attitude, so that a group regards itself associated with, belonging to, a locality which it does not *de facto* occupy, but from which it may derive its name or trace its origin; similarly, the actual blood bond of the family is extended into the fictitious relationship of a pseudo-biological unit, the clan or the gens. Such seem to be the limitations of the possible primitive groupings; all of them have been realized, the groupings on a natural basis, territorial or biological, in all cases, the groupings on a subjective basis, local or pseudo-biological, in a very large number of tribes. In religion, an interesting illustration is provided by the phenomenon of animism. Here the possibilities actually seem to be limited to one: if another world besides the material arises at all, it will be an animistic world, one fashioned after the material, but combining with it those qualities of dynamism and evasiveness necessary to account for certain of man's experiences in the objective and subjective worlds, which are reflected in his psyche as animism. Thus animism may be regarded as psychologically (or socio-psychologically) over-determined: it may be arrived at in different ways, through different specific stages of psychic elaboration, but come it must. In the more specifically intellectual range, an instance is presented by cosmogonic theories. If people think of the past of the Universe constructively at all, they may think of it as perpetually the same; as made out of nothing, or out of a preexisting state as an idea; finally, as being in a condition of flux, change, development, from its inception to the present moment. These are the plausible limits of cosmogonic speculation, and all of the possibilities enumerated above have been realized, among primitive as well as among civilized peoples.

The determinisms referred to above require some further comments. In the first place, let us repeat that these determinisms are in no sense absolute, but relative, referring as they do to certain more or less definitely fixed steps or events in a series which, from the conceptual standpoint, constitutes a system of preferential relations.

Then, again, the spring of action is not supplied in these determinisms, except in some instances of the socio-psychological group of principles. In other words, the determinisms do not, in themselves, constitute a guarantee that anything further will happen. Therefore, our generalizations in connection with this entire series of phenomena must take this form: if anything further happens—in the conceptual, mechanical, psychological line involved—it will be one of a more or less restricted set of events, inventions, ideas, or it will fall within the limits of a certain range of possibilities. A still more important consideration remains: the determinisms enumerated under the various headings constitute a comparable group of concepts only in their relation to the totality of culture or of the historic process, but within their own particular domains of phenomena the determinisms are not at all comparable and, if investigated, would have to be analyzed from vastly different standpoints and by different methods. Thus, the series of conceptual steps in the mathematical domain are part of culture, of history, in so far as they find their concrete embodiment in the history of mathematics, which is made by many men, at different times and places, and is most intimately interwoven with the progress of the exact sciences, of logic, of engineering, *etc.* The same is true of any series of mechanical inventions. More emphatically this is true of the institutional phenomena discussed under the heading of the limitation of possibilities, and, of course, of those other phenomena conceptualized under the heading of socio-psychological principles. But the determinisms involved are, firstly, none of them cultural or historical, but conceptual (or logical), mechanical, psychological, socio-psychological; and secondly, the determinisms themselves are quite different in character. Thus the steps in the mathematical series are fixed by the necessities of purely abstract and formal relations in thought. The steps of the mechanical series are only in part conceptually determined, to the extent, namely, to which the development of the theoretical principles of mechanics is involved—to that extent there is high comparability with the mathematical series. But in many of its phases the mechanical series is mechanically conditioned: there is a standstill in the development of inventions in connection with a certain problem, not because further steps are conceptually impossible, but because of the non-arising of a set of secondary problems until a certain principle is introduced, a certain invention made; then, as soon as that is achieved, new tasks and problems are revealed by the very application of the new invention; these are in turn attacked and solved, and so on. In connection with the various phenomena to which the concept of the limitation of possibilities is applicable, determinism simply means that at any given stage in the series the range of possible events is limited. Noth-

ing is implied with reference to the linkage of events in the series which is actually realized; all that determinism means here is that the indefiniteness, the adventitious character of the series decreases with the limitation of possibilities of development at any given point; the narrower the range of possible events the more rigid the determinism. Some of the principles of the socio-psychological set, finally, are of such a character as to justify the concept of "tendency" in place of "principle." Such are, for instance, the principle of division of labor and that of reaction or development to the natural limit, where, if only certain conditions are satisfied, not only the character of the event but its very occurrence seem to fall into the deterministic series.

VIII

Deterministic-Contemporaneous Category.—The relations between the different aspects of a culture are patently not strictly deterministic. That is, when one or more aspects of a culture are of a certain form and degree of development we may not expect one or more other aspects of it to be of a certain definite form and degree of development. Therefore, attempts to represent one aspect of a culture as a corollary in quality or advancement, or as a function of another, have always failed. Nevertheless, the element of determinism in our restricted sense, can evidently not be excluded from a consideration of the coexistential series. There is a limit to the possible and probable discrepancies between the different aspects of a culture. It is true that with reference to the relation of material culture and social organization, for instance, the Eskimo present an instance where a high material culture coexists with a most simple and amorphic social system, while in Australia an elaborate, in fact, intricate social organization is accompanied by arts and crafts on a distinctly primitive level. On the other hand, political aggregates of a certain measure of integration and orderliness, states, can not exist without certain advances in material culture, such as road-building and the erection of solid and more or less permanent habitations. This is exemplified not only in modern civilizations, but also in Africa in the states of the native Negroes. Similarly, the erection of modern buildings and bridges, quite apart from the technical knowledge involved, is unthinkable in a community without considerable social complexity and political integration. While these illustrations are obvious because extreme, less evident but relevant examples could readily be adduced. The social and political organization of Africa, for instance, could be roughly foreseen from the fact that a number of industries are there found equally flourishing within relatively restricted districts and among the same people. Again, in the

domains of religion and morality, a humanitarian ethics, having as one of its postulates the brotherhood of man, is incompatible with a religion which calls for human sacrifices; an undifferentiated animism is never associated with a stern individualistic ethics; a powerful monotheistic divinity invariably becomes the source of categorical sanctions of moral behavior. Similarly, in the relation of art and knowledge: realistic art, always dependent on careful observation, can not progress very far without a fairly accurate knowledge of anatomy, if animals or man are the subject; nor can other forms of art thrive or even exist without some familiarity with the principles of perspective, which again can not be dissociated from facts belonging to other branches of physics and geometry; painting and architecture, on a high level, are inconceivable without the technical knowledge which provides them with their tools and foundations. Again, when social organization and knowledge are involved, however different may be the sources, historical and psychological, from which they spring, however unlike the means of change in the two and the methods and occasions of their diffusion from tribe to tribe, definite, indeed necessary, correlations are present here also. Only crude knowledge is possible as long as social conditions are such that most adults of either sex are concerned, more or less directly, with the acquisition, elaboration and protection of the means of physical existence and of psychic balance. Not until a considerable advance has been made in the division of labor, not until specialization has brought with it relative expertness, and increasing complexity of life a slackening in the rigid enslavement of the individual, do we expect to find that degree of personal detachment, of deliberate observation, of persistent application of critical judgment, without which the systematization and conceptualization of knowledge are impossible. On the other hand, in the absence of definite knowledge of nature and of man, in their static as well as their dynamic aspects, social organization must of necessity remain unconscious in its foundations, and purely traditional or again wholly adventitious and haphazard in its customary and prescriptive as well as proscriptive aspects. With the accumulation of such knowledge, in particular with the development of methods for the study of society in its organic and more specifically social aspects, constructive legislation based on such knowledge becomes possible, and so do less clearly defined customary rules of behavior, which reflect a deeper insight into the nature of things and creatures, including man himself. Clearly, then, a certain limited determinism exists between the two sets of facts, in their coexistential aspect, which, *e. g.*, makes it possible to foresee the social organization of a group, or at least some aspects of it, when the state of knowledge in the group is known, and *vice versa*. Another

set of deterministic elements in the coexistential category falls into the realm of socio-psychological principles. These elements are well known and have been much discussed, but their relation to the totality of culture, in particular to the more strictly historical aspects of it, continue to be often misunderstood and misrepresented. These principles refer to the tendencies which spring from the coexistence and coordinated functioning, in varied situations, of individuals in different degrees of socialization. Illustrative of such principles is, for instance, the universal emergence at all times and in all societies of leaders, strong men, dominant personalities, with reference to whom the remainder of a group appears as followers, inferiors, supporters, disciples. All the phenomena of group action, in the specific sense, also belong here, as well as that even more restricted cycle of facts usually embraced under the caption of crowd-psychology. The positive correlation between common functions exercised by a group or social unit and the feeling of solidarity, is another phenomenon falling into the deterministic-contemporaneous category. So is that vast domain of data referring to symbolism on its socio-psychological side, which in its most general form may be conceptualized as the tendency displayed by groups of solidarity in function or status to project their communal consciousness into some permanent symbol, static or dynamic, which henceforth stands for the solidarity of the group, perpetuates as well as enhances that solidarity and on occasion, as, for instance, in totemism, serves to differentiate the group from other groups of solidarity in function or status, which may thus appear as equivalent social units of a common organization or system.

IX

Accidental-Historical Category.—In dealing with the facts of this category we must once more remember our definition: "accidental" does not mean uncaused, nor wholly outside the connected chain of events which constitute our conceptual universe, but an accidental event or thing is one normally belonging to another system of preferential relations than that in which it makes its appearance in the particular instance: from the standpoint of the latter system the event or thing is accidental. It thus becomes clear that all phenomena pertaining to intertribal, international, inter-culture-area contact fall into the above category. From the standpoint of the North African natives the advent of Mohammedanism was an accident; so also was the Spanish introduction of the horse among the Indians of the Plains; the appearance of White Man's iron among the American Eskimo was an accident, as well as that of "fire water" among all primitive tribes, who were suddenly thrown open to the blessings

of civilization. The coming of maize to Africa was, from the standpoint of the civilizations of that continent, wholly adventitious, and so were the beginnings of the Athapascan patterned basketry among the Tlingit of southern Alaska. The contributions made by the peoples of Asia to the cultures of Europe were one and all historical accidents for Europe, no less than were for Japan the elements of Chinese civilization in earlier days, and those of European and American civilization within our own time. Again, "Mrs. Warren's Profession" was an accident in the New World just as the "cake-walk" was in the Old. In all of the above and innumerable similar instances the "accidental" events or things did not grow out of the preferential connections of events within the recipient systems—at most one might speak of a certain readiness or preparedness for the reception of such events or things[7]—but came from without, from other systems; not only were the time and place of emergence of these events or things adventitious, but their particular contents were chance accretions to the systems which received them.

While the accidental factors are particularly conspicuous when the interacting systems represent or belong to distinct tribal complexes, culture areas, nations or even continents, the applicability of the concept of a system of preferential relations and with it of that of accidental factors, is by no means restricted to such situations. There is, on the contrary, no breach of continuity between the application of the concepts of system and accident to the mutual relations of relatively large, integral, and historico-geographically disparate units, and the application of these concepts to the interrelations of smaller and less independent systems within the limits of such units. Thus the system of legal and religious relations in a culture, while not independent from one another, may nevertheless for long perods of time proceed along relatively disparate paths of development, until the ascension to the throne of a monarch of a particular religious denomination or bent, or an impending separation of Church and State, or some other situation of like sort, throws the two systems into violent opposition to one another, or unites them by bonds of unprecedented harmony. The events or things constituting these newly acquired relations as well as the incidents which have called them into being, must, from the point of view of the two systems, be regarded as accidental.

The last and equally important application of the concept of a system refers to the individual. The most significant relations of the individual to the culture of the group are here involved. While certain aspects of the relations of the individual to the group belong specifically to the psychological-contemporaneous and the determin-

[7] *Cf.* § XII.

istic-contemporaneous categories, we are here confronted with the relations of the individual to the cultural content and to the historical series of events. Unquestionably, the specific content of the individual psyche is derived from the cultural *milieu*—where else, indeed, should it come from?—but to admit this is not to identify the individual with "his" culture, is not to represent him as a microcosm minutely reproducing the cultural macrocosm. For, in the first place, any particular individual is within reach of only a limited part of the culture of his group, as has been intimated before. This is the more true the greater the complexity of a culture; so that in modern civilization and in the more elaborate civilizations of the Ancient World the individual is truly representative only of a relatively slight fraction of the culture, is less intimately associated with a considerably larger domain of it, and remains practically outside of what may often be the major part of the culture of his group. It appears, then, that even within the limits of the standpoint just outlined the individual may not be naïvely regarded as "determined" by his culture, or as a replica of it, but that the particular participations into which he enters must, from the standpoint of the individual as a system, be regarded as in many ways adventitiously conditioned. So far, however, we have only considered the variability of the cultural content of the individual in so far as it reflects the ways in which culture comes to him. An examination of the individual as a selective agency brings out the same relation with much greater force. As is well known, the individual does not face the world of experience as a *tabula rasa* nor as a mere passive reflector. In the first place, there are the congenital capacities and limitations. Disregarding all other factors, these innate qualities alone exercise a marked influence not only on the range and degree of assimilation of the individual's cultural content, as will be readily admitted, but on the very character of that content. Thus an objectively identical cultural material will result in a vastly different cultural content, on the psychological side, in the case of the relatively passive response of the average individual when compared to the constructive, creative reaction of the gifted one. Again, an individual of limited gifts for the plastic arts, music or mathematics, for instance, is not only cut off from adding to the cultural material presented to him in one of these fields, but is powerless to assimilate it and, in certain instances, even to accept it, except in the vaguest sense. Thus, a non-musical or but slightly musical person can not, in any significant sense, even hear certain elements in a symphony of a Mahler or of a Strauss, any more than a mathematically indifferent mind can grasp the full bearing or perceive the beauty of a theoretical formulation of a problem in celestial mechanics, no matter what the training of

the particular individual. Nor is this all. Even were the biological factor eliminated, what might be called the biographical factor would remain. *Ceteris paribus,* the reaction of the individual to any particular cultural material which confronts him depends on his attention, interest, his assimilative readiness, the value or significance which the new item of experience has for his *ego,* all of which factors again depend on the totality of his past experience, on his biographical *ego,* on the particular and unique configuration of the psychic individual as a historic complex *sui generis.* All this has nothing directly to do with either culture or biology. Thus, the individual emerges as a highly adventitious aggregate of psychic elements and dispositions, unique and unforeseeable, except in its most general aspects.

The problem of the effect of the individual on culture or the historic process embraces aspects similar to the above. Culture as such as well as the historic process are, of course, super-individual phenomena. Now, the ingress of the individual as cause into culture as content, or history as process, must therefore always appear as the crossing of two relatively independent systems, and the exact time, place and purport of that crossing must be recognized as accidental, as unforeseeable, except within certain most general limits. While this would be so even though the individual were nothing but the exact replica of his culture, the fact that this is precisely what the individual is not stands for the added significance and the ever indeterminate possibilities of his breaking into the chain of historic events.

X

Accidental-Contemporaneous Category.—No sharp line evidently can be drawn between this category and the preceding one. Thus, the illustrations cited there can do service here, with a slight change of setting. This is especially true with reference to what might generically be called "foreign contact." All phenomena of diffusion have their contemporaneous aspect as well as their historic aspect of more or less extended character. The same is true of the relations occasionally arising between different aspects of a culture which normally constitute relatively disparate systems. To the illustration cited before I might add here the case of "camouflage" in the present war. Art and military development were two realms of European civilization which, before the war, were practically unrelated. With the rise of the aeroplane came the necessity of protection against the eyes of birdmen above. Thus arose "camouflage." In the domain of art this meant intensive observation from unaccustomed angles of things on the earth's surface, and the application of

the realistic artist's imagination to the creation of disguises mimicking the effects observed. In the domain of military art new possibilities were opened for surface dispositions of guns and fortifications—facts leading to further consequences in military technique—which the development of aerial scouting was about to render well-nigh impossible. As illustrating somewhat similar relations one might cite the occurrence of striking events, whether of individual or of cultural derivation, which result in rapid transvaluations of values. Witness Thomas Mott Osborne's comet-like progress through the clouded skies of criminology, with the accompanying shift in popular sentiment toward prisons and prisoners, a shift so rapid that the balance was lost, bringing with it the serious danger of reaction. Or behold the war situation, once more, with its cataclysmic transvaluations in the time-honored domain of women's clothes.

The Theoretical Categories and Cultural Reality

XI

A Vindication of the Categories.—As in any analytical separation of a series which in reality represents a continuum, our categories are not free from certain elements of artificiality which deserve some words of comment. Moreover, it is sometimes worth while to recombine the analytically separated series, thus to reap the full benefit of the conceptual clarification accompanying the analysis. To these two tasks we may now turn.

First of all, it may be objected that any contemporaneous or historical set of phenomena always present in combination those aspects of linkage and level which have here been separated into independent categories. At first sight, this procedure might seem like a gratuitous and unnecessary refinement of analysis. It is, of course, true that every historical or coexistential situation is either psychological-deterministic or psychological-accidental or objective-deterministic or objective-accidental. An apparently more logical grouping of the categories would thus be into historical-psychological-deterministic, historical-psychological-accidental, historical-objective-deterministic and historical-objective-accidental; and the same for the other temporal category, the contemporaneous or coexistential. This would also result in eight categories, with the apparent advantage of less violence being done to cultural reality. The advantages of the procedure can, however, readily be shown to be ephemeral. For if approach to cultural reality is the criterion, then it must with equal justice be pointed out that no cultural situation is ever wholly objective or wholly psychological, but combines aspects of both, according to the point of view or the purport of the analysis.

Again, from still another angle, no permanently and exclusively objective fact can ever constitute part of culture, which itself belongs to the psychic level. Thus the truly objective might be left out altogether, the categories being conceptualized as actively psychological and potentially psychological. Then again the deterministic and accidental aspects of a situation are not mutually exclusive, but represent two sides of the historic reality which is never wholly deterministic nor yet wholly accidental, but comprises enough stabilizing factors to allow the formulation of certain historical principles or tendencies, even though not laws, and enough accidental factors to justify the concept of the uniqueness of historic events. And, finally, the historical or sequential and the contemporaneous or coexistential series do not represent two sharply distinguishable sets of events, but an ever-flowing continuum. Bergson is right when he makes light of the existential character of the present. Tomorrow has barely time to be to-day before it becomes yesterday. What results from this critique of our analysis is thus the rehabilitation of cultural reality, which is never wholy deterministic nor yet wholly accidental, never wholly psychological (or active-psychological) nor yet wholly objective (or potential-psychological), never wholly of yesterday nor yet wholly of today, but combines all these in its existential reality. That such a rehabilitation of culture would result from a critique of the categories as representing but certain aspects of cultural reality, was, however, to be expected: a reconstructive synthesis reestablishes the unity necessarily lost in the process of analytical dismemberment. There is clearly nothing in this experiment *per se* which would constitute a justifiable criticism of the categories. They must stand and fall with the theoretical validity and significance of distinguishing for purposes of analysis the three standpoints from which the categories are derived, namely those of time, level, and linkage. The justification of the standpoints again can only lie in the resulting clarification of concepts, a result of which the endorsement or rejection must evidently rest with those under whose eyes these lines will fall.

XII

The Deterministic and the Accidental in History.—It must have appeared before this that the deterministic and the accidental aspects of history and of culture are intimately interrelated, being in fact both complementary and mutually restrictive. The deterministic tendencies are in various ways influenced and kept in check by the accidental factors. It must be remembered that the deterministic tendencies do not as a rule in themselves contain the dynamic elements, the driving power of development. With certain funda-

mental socio-psychological principles this is very nearly the case, but generally the deterministic aspect merely suggests that, *in case* anything happens within the series or system, it is likely to be one of a number of things or events pointed to by the tendency. Conceptually these possible events may be designated as the limiting values of the deterministic tendency. The driving power, the "yeast" of history, is supplied by various accidental factors, in origin individual, or socio-psychological, at any rate, external to a given system. Not that these accidental factors must of necessity fall into the "foreign contact" group. If the culture is at all complex, the processes of cultural self-fertilization through interactions between smaller systems included in the cultural group or nation are quite adequate to supply the "yeast" by themselves. Among these smaller systems the individual is one, for, under these favorable conditions, the individual is sufficiently distinctive as a system of relations and sufficiently unique as content to have through his creativeness, originality, personality, will, non-conformism, crankiness, *etc.*, a marked effect on the cultural content as well as on the chain of historic events. In small and relatively isolated groups, such as are typical of primitive conditions and occur sporadically in higher civilizations, the drag of socio-psychological and institutional inertia is such that non-conformism is exceedingly rare, that individual creativeness itself is robbed of its germinating fire by the unyielding resistance of the channels through which it is forced to operate. In such situations the "yeast" of foreign contact comes like the breath of life, whipping into shape the heretofore unrealized possibilities of the deterministic tendencies. Again, only the *what* of events is within limits deterministic; the *when* and only to a lesser extent the *how*, are accidental. Also, it must be remembered that the limiting values of determinism are, in history, practically never fixed with absoluteness, but merely consist in a limited number of possibilities. Which way the dice will fall, what will actually happen, is a matter of accident. Thus, the accidental appears, after all, as predominant in history, when it comes to the particular *when, where, how,* and even *what,* of events. The concept of the "uniqueness of historic events" is thus vindicated. Accident decrees whether anything will happen, when and how it will happen, which one of several possibilities will be realized, whether this actualization of a potential event will occur through the maturing of certain elements within a system or through the ready acceptance of an appropriate element coming from without, by foreign contact.

The accidental itself, on the other hand, is restricted by the deterministic factors. Certain things coming from without a system or even originating from within will not "take." The new element

does not find a deterministic current strong enough to carry it to fruition, or it may even be opposed by a contrary current. Certain things, of foreign or inner origin, "mean nothing." Examples of this are plentiful when two cultures of greatly different level come into contact. Two Australian tribes, or an Australian and a Melanesian one, will exchange cultural elements extending, perhaps, along the entire line of their cultural possessions, and all might prove fruitful and stimulating. The same will hold with reference to two representatives of modern civilization. When, on the other hand, a modern group comes into contact with one of those primitive tribes, the mutual stimulation is slight or follows certain very narrow channels. The primitive group adopts certain cruder products of our material culture, without, however, learning how to make them; it may borrow certain externals of etiquette and address, but the foreign art, religion, social system, legal form, "mean nothing" to them, they "fall" completely "flat," they glide off the surface of their culture without leaving as much as a scratch. The same, of course is true with reference to the effect in the reverse direction. Again, other elements encounter a reception in a culture which, by its readiness and assimilating quality suggests the support of a deterministic tendency. Then, we say, an event occurs at the "psychological moment;" or certain tendencies or potentialities are "in the air;" a new element finds ready acceptance, if it chimes in with "the spirit of the times;" a tribe, a nation is "prepared" for certain developments or innovations. In certain cultural situations, when the deterministic elements are pronounced, then, especially if the possibilities of the situation are limited, a thing or event, or one of a few, is almost "bound" to appear, on any number of provocations. In such a case the situation may be designated as overdetermined. This is the determinist's long suit. With reference to great men he will say: "if not he, then someone else;" similarly, with reference to the theory of history: "it is important not whether the thing did happen, but whether it could happen," meaning that, although the particular thing may not have happened, the "time was ripe for it," and another equivalent thing either might have happened, or did so with high probability. But withal there is no denying the overwhelming weight of accidental factors. Of these, those belonging to the "foreign contact" group are of special importance. Not only do they constitute the "yeast" of the historic process, but they bring content; they stimulate through "the shock of novelty;" they shine by the "prestige of things foreign;" they raise cultural contents into consciousness through contrast, and thus invite comparison, provoke ratiocination, engender wideawakeness.

The new content, moreover, increases the variety, complexity, richness of a culture.

Thus the accidental and the deterministic appear as two inseparable ingredients of the historic process. Leave out the deterministic, and history becomes a hodge-podge of adventitious things and events, a something without rhyme or reason; leave out the accidental, and grave injustice is done to reality, for law and order is then claimed as a fact, whereas it is at best but an aspiration, a tendency, not strong enough to have its way wholly, but fully strong enough to regulate, and to that extent to control, the stream of accidental fact.

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FREE WILL AND INTUITION

THE problem of free will appears to be a problem only because, as Bergson well says, the conditions are not clearly stated. The difficulty of stating the conditions is due to a hazy idea of the meaning of cause and effect.

One of the earliest experiences a human being has is what the intellect defines as a "succession in time." This sort of experience is with us constantly. We know some things happen before other things happen. This knowledge is due to memory. It is this experience which underlies our concept of cause and effect. Without such an experience cause and effect would mean nothing to us. But before the concept of cause and effect can enter our consciousness, to this experience must be added another experience which the intellect defines as "repetition." The oftener a succession in time is repeated the stronger is our belief in cause and effect. Especially is this belief strong if we can repeat the succession at will in a laboratory. Given this possibility, science steps in and says the earlier event bears to the later event the relation of cause to effect. This is all that science means by cause and effect.

Now when we say a thing is repeated, just what do we mean by that? Suppose I go into a laboratory to make an experiment with a falling weight. I used an Atwater machine and measure the time it takes a weight to fall. By this I mean I compare the space passed over by a certain motion of the weight, with the space passed over by the motion of the hands of an accurate clock. All that science does when it thinks it measures time is to compare the spaces passed over by different motions. Very well. I record my results. I then do the same thing the next day and the next and so on. I have then recorded what I call a repetition of a succession in time. It is from

just this foundation that science starts. Now have I repeated the experiment? It appears so and all science makes that assumption. Let us see, however, just what the phenomenon really was. When I first let the weight fall it moved not only relative to the machine and the floor, but there was a certain relation between the weight and every other particle of matter in the universe. The phenomenon really consisted of the whole of these relations. I ask then, was the phenomenon repeated? Certainly not. But just because, out of the whole phenomenon only a very small portion of all the relations held any interest for me, *i. e.*, could affect my possible actions, I restricted my attention to that small portion and found it could be repeated. Hence I say there is such a thing as repetition. Science is a tool designed to help action and it is justified in drawing conclusions from a portion of the whole relative only to possible actions, but can philosophy do this sort of thing with consciousness? To draw conclusions from a portion of the whole is to say that the whole consists of parts. Can we say that of consciousness?

By consciousness I mean the living *present* as we know it in ourselves. Now the first thing to say about the present is that it is lived but can not be described. A little thought will prove this. The minute you start to describe the present, the present has become at once the process of describing the past. No matter how we struggle and what subtleties of reasoning we introduce, we can not get away from this fact. If I ask you to draw a picture, but move the picture rapidly before your eyes, the first thing you will say is, "Hold it still. How can I draw it if you keep moving it about?" Just so. But you can not hold consciousness still and remain conscious. How then can you describe it? If you can not describe it why do you say it is composed of parts? If it is not composed of parts how can there be repetition in it? What you describe is the *past*. The past is fixed, static, and has special qualities and in describing it you will naturally pick out similarities and from this you get the false idea of repetition in consciousness. Once you realize that the *present*, which is consciousness, is lived but can not be described, while the *past* can be described but is not lived, then you will see that what you take to be repetition in consciousness is really nothing but repetition in the past. You examine the past but think you are examining the present.

The same misunderstanding shows itself in the problem of motion. Some philosophers believe they can describe motion. They start in by saying they are going to describe a motion from A to B. But if the motion is from A to B either it has stopped at B or has gone beyond B. If it stopped at B it no longer exists and how can you describe what does not exist? On the other hand if it has

gone beyond *B* nothing you say about *AB* is connected with the motion because by the hypothesis the motion is not there, but somewhere else, namely beyond *B*. What is described is not the motion but the path passed over by the motion. You describe space but think you are describing motion. This is the same kind of error noted above. Now in consciousness, motion experienced is properly called time, or, as Bergson says, duration. Time, like the present, is experienced but can not be analyzed, while space, like the past, can be analyzed but is never experienced. It seems absurd to say that space is never experienced but a little thought will prove it. A baby infers space by finding that more time is experienced between sensations *A* and *B* than between sensations *B* and *C* when it is doing what we call creeping around. Space, as we know it, is the first inference we draw from our experience of time. We draw this inference so early in life that we forget that it is an inference. It is, however, just that and it is extremely probable that this inference is not drawn, in the shape we draw it, by animals and insects because their intellectual life must be different from ours.

The lack of repetition in consciousness means the lack of the ability to predict, because prediction is based on repetition. You can not predict the result of a first event, you can only observe that result and use your observation as a basis from which to predict the result if the event is repeated. Therefore, you can predict nothing concerning consciousness and that is all that is meant by free will.

We have found then a radical distinction between the present and the past, time and space. We can also find a distinction just as radical between instinct and intuition on the one hand and reason on the other hand.

We will start first with instinct and I will cite the well-known case in insects so thoroughly studied by Fabre. The yellow winged Sphex chooses a cricket for its victim. The cricket has three nerve centers which control its three pairs of legs. The Sphex stings the cricket first under the neck, then behind the prothorax and then where the thorax joins the abdomen. The result is that the cricket is paralyzed, it can not move, but it does not die at once. The eggs of the Sphex are then laid and the young, when hatched, have fresh meat on which to live. This is an example of instinct which can not be explained by reason. It is not possible to explain instinct intellectually, but a reference to a certain instinct in man may make it understood. Consider the sex act upon which reproduction depends. Before puberty you can reason with children about this act as much as you like and they will not understand what you mean, but after puberty reasoning is superfluous. Without any intellectual knowledge of the body or the race value of the sex act, a boy and girl,

under proper conditions, will perform the act the right way without any hesitation. Why? Because, when growth reaches a certain point instinctive knowledge appears with it. Now the difference between instinct and intuition is that instinct is limited by the growth and condition of the body while, except in the abnormal, intuition is not limited in this way but is dependent upon what we call experience, *i. e.*, conditions the body lives through. But it is like instinct in that it gives us a knowledge no reasoning can disturb and unhesitatingly we act on this knowledge.

What now is the difference between intuitional and intellectual knowledge?

As it happens, I was one of the first in this country to take up the study of aeronautics at about the year 1890. My study convinced me that it was possible to fly, and I did at that time and later publish reasons why it was possible. These reasons, however, produced no effect. At the present time many have seen machines flying through the air, they know flying is possible but they did not get that knowledge through reasoning, they actually saw the machines fly, *i. e.*, the knowledge they have of flying is intuitional, not intellectual. They can not give you any reasons why the machine flies but they know it does fly and no amount of reasoning can convince them that flying is impossible, whereas before they saw a machine fly no amount of reasoning could convince them it could fly, as I very well know. That is only to say "seeing is believing." But what does this mean in philosophy? It means that intuitional knowledge, which is the knowledge we get direct from experience without using our reason, is stronger than the knowledge we get by using our reason, which is intellectual knowledge.

One of the greatest changes in educational systems is the move from the text-book to the laboratory. But in philosophy this means the substitution of intuitional for intellectual knowledge.

Bergson is very clear in showing thoroughly the limitations of the intellect, but when he describes intuition his position seems to me to be weak. He seems to make of it something rare, exceptional, subtle, coming only to a few people. This is not so. Intuition has too long stood for something elusive, on the order of the occult. It is nothing of the sort. It is a common fact in experience.

Even in those sciences which seem to be entirely intellectual, like mathematics, it can be shown easily that intuition is their foundation. Our knowledge of axioms is entirely intuitional knowlege. Every premise from which reasoning starts is intuitional knowledge, or if not, the reasoning has to go back to the point where the premise *is* intuitional knowledge.

It will be objected that while this sort of knowledge may be called intuitional since it comes direct from personal experience, is not arrived at through reason and hence can not be called intellectual, still this is not what is ordinarily called intuition. This is true. Generally the word intuition is used to mean that which makes us believe and act without reason and yet which seems not to be traceable to anything in our experience. It appears to come "out of the blue" so to speak. It is just this characteristic which makes the mystical type of man believe strongly in intuition and the practical type skeptical of it. This characteristic of what, ordinarily, is called intuition, is due to the fact that an intuition of this type can not be traced to any particular part of our experience. But this is simply because it issues from the *whole* of our experience up to the time of the intuition. It is only this type of intuition which generally goes by the name of intuition; the other type, which issues from some definite portion of our experience, is called "common sense." The difference between the two types is just the difference between the free act and the not free act. The former issues from the *whole* man and as the *whole* man is never repeated the act is free; the latter issues from some portion of him, *i. e.*, a habit, a reflex or a reaction to stimulus which can be repeated, hence the act is not free. If I play the violin with exceptional skill upon a certain occasion, the particular skill shown can not be traced to any particular day's practise, it issues from the *whole* of my experience as a violinist. All artists understand this. All artists understand that the value of their work is determined by the quality of the intuition which issues from the *whole* of their experience at the moment they start creating.

So, what is called "intuition" issues spontaneously from the whole of our experience, while what is called "common sense" issues from some particular, limited part of our experience. The philosopher, however, is bound to hold "common sense" to be intuitional knowledge, and he knows, if he is wise, that it is far superior to intellectual knowledge.

In spite of the fact that the man of the street reads little philosophy, the teachings of philosophers filter down to him through the schools and it is unfortunate that we are at present under the influence of the teachings of a philosopher whose theory of knowledge admitted only the intellect, namely, Kant.

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REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Belief in God and Immortality. JAMES H. LEUBA. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. 1916. Pp. xvii + 340.

An historical account is given of the distinction between the primitive and the modern belief in immortality and the present status is presented statistically. Belief in God, which was treated genetically in an earlier work by the author is here also investigated by the questionnaire method. Both beliefs are shown to be waning at the present time in the United States, among the groups of scholars questioned. The questionnaire has been used in this study with more than ordinary care and the results are well tabulated, illustrated and interpreted.

The decline of interest in the belief in immortality naturally lessens zest for the historical phases of the problem and these are inaccessible to empirical inquiry. On more theoretical and speculative grounds the author holds that there have been two distinct beliefs with reference to life after death. One had its origin at an earlier stage in phenomena of perception, memory, and childlike imagination. It was a belief in ghosts and it arose from dreams, memory-images exteriorized, metamorphoses in nature, reflections and echoes and the like. No corresponding account is suggested of the origin of the modern belief. It is characterized, however, as concerned with the soul rather than with the ghost, as a state definitely desired and not merely expected, and as bound up with specific moral ideals. Probably a fuller study of the phenomena than the scope of this volume permitted in both the primitive and modern forms with the aid of social psychology would indicate greater continuity while allowing the appearance of new factors. Indeed Professor Leuba admits that in its early form the belief was accompanied by desire, and that in Christianity where the desire and the moral ideal are pronounced, there still persists belief in ghosts and in the survival of the body.

Difficulties appeared in the investigation of the belief in God which were not found in the study of immortality. Many were not sure of the meaning of the questions. This was particularly true of the philosophers. There may be more significance in this fact than is specified. The questions are precisely such as the philosophers, more than any other of the groups, consider. They are probably as critical and as free to express themselves. The questionnaire called for acceptance or rejection or indecision on this proposition: "I believe in a God in intellectual and affective communication with man, I mean a God to whom one may pray in the expectation of receiving an answer." What should one reply who thinks of God

as "the common Will"? or as the Social Mind? Professor Leuba seems to think the answer should be negative, if one may judge from the last lines on page 272.

Various replies suggest that some think that God is not the same to religious experience as to philosophical thought. Religion is a practical activity and it tends to emphasize personal relations and attitudes. Philosophical reflection is more detached, less concrete and vivid. Material objects appear differently in the practical use of them and in reflective analysis of them. One wonders what such a questionnaire would achieve with reference to "Uncle Sam." No one believes that there is a particular person of a certain height and weight and color of eyes answering to that name. Yet a very substantial reality is designated by it.

The views of the author appear freely in the discussions of the statistics. He holds that "detailed acquaintance with the orderliness of physical nature dispossessed God of that realm" and implies that the same is true of the mental realm (p. 240). Christianity is identified with its reigning forms (p. 248), which one should hardly strive to preserve. Human society generates moral ideals and the impulses to realize them, and this is a sufficient living creed (pp. 330 ff.).

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The History and Practice of Psychanalysis. By POUL BJERRE, M.D., translated by ELIZABETH N. BARROW. Boston: Richard G. Badger. 1916. Pp. 294.

The first part of the book is an attempt to gather up the psychotherapeutic strands of the last century, beginning with Kant and Feuchtersleben, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the schools of hypnotism founded by Liébeault and Bernheim at Nancy, with their reaction on Wetterstrand. Bjerre then traces the rise of Freud, Dubois, Forel, and Moll, and the development of the present psychoanalytic schools. Finally, he presents a description of Adler's theories. He barely touches upon the work of Jung, although Jung's influence is seen throughout the book.

The latter half of the book deals with such questions as the nature of hypnosis, and the relative importance of the conscious and the unconscious.

The book, although containing many passages that are readable and stimulating, is marked by its careless English. This fault, I suspect, is due to either a lack on the part of the translator of psychoanalytic knowledge or to an insufficient understanding of our own or the original language.

One example of faulty terminology occurs on page 86. Here Freud is made to say that the four psychological processes in the construction of the dream are as follows: (1) Condensing, (2) displacement, (3) *sensualizing,* (4) censoring. What the author means to convey by the word *sensualizing* is the process of dramatization. In a brief note he explains the term by stating that "the dream has an inclination to present everything in acoustic and visual pictures. It does not approve of the narrative form but is, in its essentials, dramatic." Why not, then, use the term dramatizing, instead of the misleading *sensualizing.*

This is but one of a number of inaccuracies in the description of Freud's theories. Mistakes occur also in the delineation of the theories elaborated by Adler and Jung. Therefore, with the exception of a very excellent chapter on the nature of hypnosis, the book has little value as a history and practise of psychoanalysis.

As a practise of psychotherapeutics by Poul Bjerre, however, the work is extremely interesting. The personality of the author shines throughout as that of a natural born psychotherapist of wide reading and extensive practical experience. The very interesting history of the analysis and cure of a case of paranoia of ten years' duration bears evidence of Bjerre's undoubted skill and ability.

We trust that Bjerre's future works will be put into the hands of a more able translator. Unquestionably a man of his development has important messages to give to the world, especially to those of us who are working in the same field.

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NEW YORK.

JOURNALS AND NEW BOOKS

PSYCHOLOGICAL CLINIC, Vol. XLI., No. 1. March 15, 1918. *Preliminary Impressions of the Standard Revision of the Binet-Simon Scale.* J. E. WALLACE WALLIN (pp. 1–15).—Preliminary impressions of the scale from its use may be summarized as follows: The amateur will find it much more difficult to administer the Stanford scale than the old Binet scale, while anyone who merely tests subjects occasionally will certainly not be able to do satisfactory testing. We doubt whether some of the tests should be administered according to the Stanford formulas, while we also question the propriety of even including some of the tests. We are not yet ready to analyze our Stanford records, but it is evident that the scattering is very extensive in this scale, apparently more extensive than in the 1908 and 1911 editions. The practical significance of this fact is a problem for future study. Altogether, we are in-

clined to feel that the Stanford revision marks some advance, but we feel that it would be unfortunate if the scale were to be regarded as a finality. *A Study of 100 Retarded Fourth Grade Pupils Tested by the Binet Scale:* WILLIAM I. LACY (pp. 16–23).—A study of the slow progress of children of the fourth grade in a certain district in Illinois was made. The conclusions drawn are: The systems of promotion generally in vogue in this country are unfair to the child, uneconomic and unscientific; and the use of intelligence tests for promotion should be adopted. Having white and colored children together in the same schools is educationally and socially unwise; separate schools for colored children should therefore be established. Feeblemindedness should be detected through the use of intelligence tests, and children found to be feebleminded or very nearly so, should be placed in regular institutions, schools, or rooms equipped to take care of them. The Intelligence Quotient should be found for all children, and the subject matter and methods of instruction adapted to the intellectual capacity, rather than the chronological size. *Clinical Reports. Reviews and Criticism. News and Comment.*

Efros, Israel Isaac. The Problem of Space in Jewish Mediaeval Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press. 1917. Pp. 125.

Peterson, Joseph, and Quentin, J. David. The Psychology of Handling Men in the Army. Minneapolis: Perine Book Company. Pp. iii + 146.

Roback, Abraham A. The Interference of Will-Impulses, with Application to Pedagogy, Ethics and Practical Efficiency. Princeton, N. J.: Psychological Review Company. Pp. viii + 158.

NOTES AND NEWS

THE *Philosophical Review* for September, 1918, contains a very interesting article by André Lalande, on "Philosophy in France in 1917." In spite of the way in which the war has demanded in France all the energies of the nation, philosophy there has been kept going to an extent that shows very strongly how genuinely intellectual and free the French really are.

The following are some titles to which M. Lalande calls attention: *La Force et le Droit,* by M. R. Anthony, an examination of the "droit biologique," and *Devoirs et perils biologiques,* by Dr. Grasset. An article of distinction in the *Revue de Métaphysique* is by M. Davy, in which the writer examines the question *Why is the pledge of one's*

word binding? the bearing of which is obvious. M. Lévy-Ullmann in a very interesting and learned volume, *Le Definition du droit,* "reviews all the classical definitions of law and discusses their merits and defects."

Popular opinion in France is increasingly favorable to the idea of a Society of Nations, and has more and more confidence in it since the idea is regarded as sponsored by President Wilson. On this subject two important volumes have appeared, both entitled *La Société des Nations,* one by a jurist, M. Maxime Leroy, and the other by M. Edgard Milhaud, Dean of the Faculty of Social and Economic Sciences at Geneva. There is also a pamphlet by M. Ferdinand Buisson, entitled *Les Principles de la Société des Nations.*

Criticisms of German philosophy naturally can hardly be enumerated. M. Lalande mentions, however, *Science française et science allemande* by Dr. G. Papillaut, professor at the Paris School of Anthropology, and *Morale kantienne et morale humaine* by M. Sartiaux, a writer of conservative tendencies. One young professor at the University of Geneva, M. Charles Werner, defends the German philosophy of conservative associations. He regards Hegelianism as still the noblest and most satisfying form of philosophy.

In psychology there is a good treatise on *Memory* by M. Dugas, and a number of studies of mental disturbances due to the war. *La guerre et le progrès* by M. J. Sageret represents excellently the sort of philosophical ideas popular among the mass of educated people who are not specialists. A good little book is, *Le science du travail et de son organisation* by Mlle. Joteyko. Dr. Bernheim defends in *Automatisme et Suggestion* the position of the school of Nancy, while M. Boirac's latest book, *L'Avenir des Sciences psychiques* discusses the phenomena supposed by some to call occult powers into play, and which M. Bernheim rejects as illusions.

Two notable deaths occurred during 1917, that of M. Félix Le Dantec and that of M. Émile Durkheim. "Félix Le Dantec had the training and career of a professional man of science. He taught biology at the Sorbonne. But he always felt the influence of the solid mathematical, and particularly physical, discipline with which he began his studies." "Émile Durkheim was essentially a philosopher, although he had won his reputation as a sociologist. Like many philosophers, he was a man of intense feeling. By the constant exercise of his will, he imposed a rigorous form on his ideas. But the natural force of his imagination and emotion, which he had disciplined but not destroyed, was one element in his great influence. . . . He died prematurely at fifty-nine years of age, exhausted by a great sorrow [the death of his son fighting against the Bulgarians], and perhaps also by the excessive labors in which he had sought relief."

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Archives of Psychology—Sub-station 84, N. Y.: Archives of Psychology.
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Psychological Clinic—Philadelphia: Psychological Clinic Press.
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